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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ZONING - LOCAL ZONING ORDINANCE
EXCLUDING MORE THAN Two UNRELATED PERSONS FROM OCCU-
PANCY OF SINGLE FAMILY HOMES HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas (U.S. 1974)
Plaintiffs, the two owners of a Belle Terre, New York, residence'
and their three unrelated student tenants,2 brought an action under the
Civil Rights Act of 18713 challenging the constitutionality of the village
zoning ordinance on the grounds that it denied them equal protection of
the laws; restrained their right of freedom of association; intruded upon
their right of privacy; and contravened their right to travel.4 The ordi-
nance effectively prohibited groups of more than two unrelated persons -
as distinguished from groups consisting of any number of persons related
by blood, marriage, or legal adoption - from occupying a single-family
residence within the township.5 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York upheld the ordinance as a lawful exercise
of police power intended to protect and maintain the traditional family
patterns of the area.6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
1. Belle Terre is a village of about two hundred and twenty homes, inhabited
by seven hundred people, on Long Island's north shore. Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974).
2. Originally there were six unrelated individuals that resided in the house, but
only three joined in the suit. Id. at 3.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section authorizes a private federal remedy
for deprivation of constitutional rights. It provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance . . . of any State
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
Id.
4. Brief for Appellees at 6-8.
5. Only "families" were permitted to occupy single-family residences. The
applicable section of the zoning ordinance defined "family" as:
One or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants.
A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as
a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage
shall be deemed to constitute a family.
Building Zone Ordinance of the Village of Belle Terre, Art. I, § D-1.35a (June 8,
1970) [hereinafter referred to as "the ordinance"]. See 416 U.S. at 2.
6. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
Although the district court rejected defendants' arguments that the ordinance fur-
thered familiar zoning objectives, such as safety, adequate light and air, prevention
of overpopulation, reduction of traffic congestion, and facilitation of providing adequate
public facilities, it stated that single-family zoning nevertheless was within the area
of valid general health and welfare objectives. Id.
(819)
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Circuit, employing a "sliding scale" equal protection test 7 to determine
the validity of the ordinance, reversed and held that maintenance of tra-
ditional family patterns was not within the ambit of local zoning powers.8
The United States Supreme Court, addressing a zoning ordinance for
the first time in 46 years,9 reversed, holding that the ordinance 1) was
not aimed at transients; 2) involved no procedural disparities; 3) involved
no deprivation of any fundamental right; and 4) was a valid land use
regulation addressed to family needs. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
The United States Supreme Court first upheld the validity of a local
zoning ordinance in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' 0 finding
it to be a legitimate exercise of the police power." The Court stated that
in order for an ordinance to be declared unconstitutional, it must be
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.' 1 2 Since Euclid, courts
have tended to presume zoning ordinances valid'" in the face of attacks
upon these ordinances on three distinct legal theories: for lack of specific
legislative authorization;14 as being beyond the police power justification
as not reasonably related to the public welfare;15 and as being invalid
under the equal protection clause. 16 Traditionally, equal protection analy-
sis has consisted of a "two-tier" approach. First, under the "minimum
scrutiny" or "rational relationship" test, the ordinance will be upheld if
the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that there is no rational relationship
between the ends sought and the classification utilized in the ordinance.
1 7
7. For a brief discussion of this equal protection standard, see note 55 infra.
8. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 818 (2d Cir. 1973).
9. The Court last addressed a zoning question in Seattle Title Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
10. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). A local landowner challenged the constitutionality of
a village zoning ordinance which excluded from residential districts apartment houses,
retail stores, and other like establishments, on the grounds that such regulation
deprived him of liberty and property without due process of law. Id. at 373.
11. Id. at 395.
12. Id. (citations omitted). Two terms later the Court declared a local zoning
ordinance arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to a particular parcel of land. Nectow
v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
13. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.14, at 67 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as ANDERSON], where numerous cases are cited to support this presump-
tive validity. Id. at n.20.
14. See, e.g., City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116
(1966), where an ordinance was held invalid for its lack of specific legislative authori-
zation. See note 29 and accompanying text infra.
15. For a comprehensive statement of this theory, which was the basis of the
challenge in Euclid, see 8A E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.279, at
278-79 (3d ed. 1965).
16. See notes 20 & 25 infra.
17. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970); Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955). See also McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing cases), where Chief Justice Warren articulated
the minimal scrutiny test, stating:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. . . . A statutory dis-
crimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it.
Id. at 425-26 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See generally Tussman & ten-
Brock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
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However, if the classification is deemed to be inherently "suspect" or if it
restricts the exercise of a "fundamental right," the second tier of the test
requires that the state demonstrate a compelling interest in the establish-
ment and maintenance of such a classification."'
In response to these challenges, the courts, while upholding zoning
ordinances designed to preserve the single-family, residential character
of neighborhoods,10 have refused to permit those that are racially discrimi-
natory 20 and, in recent years, those that are considered exclusionary.21 In
this latter category, for example, minimum lot 22 and floor space restric-
18. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (fundamental right
of interstate travel infringed) ; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (classifica-
tion based on race invalid); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Election, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(1966) (fundamental right to vote infringed). See generally Developments in the
Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
19. See, e.g., Palo Alto Tenants' Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912
(N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973). See 8 E. McQULLIN,
supra note 15, § 25.24, at 64, where the author states that a fundamental purpose of
zoning is to preserve the character of the neighborhood. See also ANDERSON, supra
note 13, § 7.25, at 540.
20. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), where the Court, before its
decision in Euclid, struck down a city ordinance based on a racial classification. Recent
lower federal court decisions have closely scrutinized municipal land ordinances that
bear overtones or have the effect of racial exclusion. See Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n
v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971), wherein the court found certain municipal actions, including a moratorium
on new subdivisions and the rezoning of a proposed low-income housing site as open
space and park area, racially discriminatory. See also Southern Alameda Spanish
Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). In that case,
the court suggested in a dictum that a city-wide referendum which nullified a rezon-
ing ordinance permitting construction of low- and moderate-income housing would
violate the equal protection clause if, as a result of the referendum, the zoning scheme
discriminated against low-income residents. Id. at 295. Accord, Norwalk CORE
v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
The decision by the Supreme Court in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971) (low-income housing referendum law upheld), however, cast doubt on the
validity of these decisions, especially since it was handed down only two years after
the Court's contrary decision in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (refer-
endum law racially discriminatory on its face struck down). Apparently the Supreme
Court will not utilize the compelling state interest test if a municipality's exclu-
sionary tactics, such as ordinances dependent on wealth classifications, cannot be
shown to have had a racially discriminatory motive or purpose, regardless of the
resulting racially exclusionary effect. But see Lefcoe, The Public Housing Refer-
endum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1384 (1971); Note,
The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dand-
ridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971). See United Farmworkers of Florida Housing
Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974), a recent decision
that found a refusal to permit a proposed low-income housing project to tie into a
city's existing water and sewer systems racially discriminatory.
21. The term "exclusionary zoning" refers to zoning which has as an objective
economic segregation which effectively blocks the influx of low- and middle-income
families into the area. See generally Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zon-
ing, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rv. 767 (1969).
22. See Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952) (3-acre minimum sustained). In
recent years, courts have begun to strike down minimum lot requirements as violative
of substantive due process because they are not related to the protection of the general
welfare. See, e.g., Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970)
(2- and 3-acre requirements held unconstitutional) ; and National Land & Inv. Co. v.
Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (4-acre
requirement held unconstitutional). For a discussion of this line of cases, see Com-
ment, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary Zoning: From Bilbar to
Girsh - A Decade of Change, 16 VILL. L. REv. 507 (1971). But see Steel Hill Dev.,
MAY 1974]
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tions, 2 3 and bans against multi-family dwellings 24 have been declared un-
constitutional as not having been reasonably related to the general welfare
of the community.
25
As to "blood-related" ordinances similar to the one in Belle Terre,
26
lower courts have been generally unreceptive to them due to their exclu-
sionary nature. 27 In City of Des Plaines v. Trottner,28 the Supreme Court
of Illinois, in examining this type of ordinance, never reached defendants'
due process and equal protection arguments, but intimated in dicta that
Inc. v. Town of Sanborton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972), noted in 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 1035 (1973) (3- and 6-acre minimum lot requirements upheld under general
welfare provision of state enabling statute). See generally Note, Large Lot Zoning,
78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969).
23. See Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954) (minimum floor-
space requirements invalid as an unreasonable use of police power). But see Lions-
head Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal
dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953) (upholding an ordinance which set large floor
space minimums).
24. See Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (failure of township's
zoning plan to provide for apartments held unconstitutional) ; Township of Willistown
v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Comm. Ct. 453, 300 A.2d 107 (1973) (equally
divided court found that a local zoning plan must provide for "fair share" of multi-
family dwellings). See generally Comment, Zoning: Closing The Economic Gap,
43 TEmP. L.Q. 347 (1970); Note, In Re Appeal of Girsh: A Pig In the Parlor
Instead of the Barnyard?, 32 U. PIr. L. REV. 83 (1970); Comment, supra note 22.
See also notes 96-98 and accompanying text infra.
25. In addition to these due process challenges, constitutional arguments for strict
judicial scrutiny of exclusionary zoning ordinances under the equal protection clause
have been advanced under varying theories. For example, it has been suggested that
housing is a fundamental right. See Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v.
City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1970) (dictum). See also Aloi,
Goldberg & White, Racial And Economic Segregation By Zoning: Death Knell For
Home Rule?, 1 U. TOL. L. REV. 65, 80 (1969). Other such theories are that wealth
is a suspect classification and that the ordinances prohibit the right to travel. See
generally Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination of the
Current Controversy, 25 VAND. L. REv. 1111 (1972); Davidoff & Gold, Exclusionary
Zoning, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION, Winter, 1970, at 56; Note, Exclusionary
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971); Note, Snob Zoning:
Must a Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 339 (1970) ; Note, The Responsi-
bility of Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents, 23 STAN. L. REv. 774
(1971); and Note, Low-Income Housing In The Suburbs: The Problem of Exclu-
sionary Zoning, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 58 (1971). Several of these arguments were raised
in the instant case. See notes 45-54 and accompanying text infra.
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court outside the zoning area, however,
have raised serious questions as to the validity of the above-mentioned theories and
the willingness of the Court to expand the parameters of the equal protection clause.
It is doubtful that the Court would render different decisions if faced with the same
challenges in the zoning context. See note 20 supra. See also San Antonio Ind.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-40 (1973), for a recent discussion of funda-
mental rights and a rejection of the argument that wealth is a suspect classification;
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970), in which allocations of welfare benefits were held not subject to strict
scrutiny; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972), wherein the Court refused
to declare that access to a particular quality of housing is a fundamental right.
26. See note 5 supra.
27. See Note, "Burning The House to Roast the Pig": Unrelated Individuals
and Single Family Zoning's Blood Relation Criterion, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 138, 161
(1972), for a discussion of how single-family zoning ordinances limit access of unre-
lated persons to suburbia. The author suggests that the exclusionary effects of blood-
related zoning have a detrimental impact, not only on the unrelated tenants, but also
on regional housing needs. Id. at 152.
28. 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
[VOL. 19
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 5 [1974], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.l w.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss /8
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
the asserted justifications for blood-related zoning ordinances would not
satisfy even a rational relationship test.
29
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough
of Manasquan,30 struck down as sweepingly excessive ordinances designed
to prohibit renting of season seashore resorts to unrelated individuals
and noted that the zoning ordinances were not intended to prevent anti-
social conduct in dwelling situations. 31 The court pointed out that under
the ordinance, "two unrelated families of spouses and children cannot share
an adequate cottage or house for the summer, nor could a small unrelated
group of widows, widowers, older spinsters or bachelors - or even
of judges.
'32
Reaching a contrary result in Palo Alto Tenants' Union v. Morgan,
33
a federal district court in California sustained the validity of the city's
definition of "family"3 4 against a constitutional challenge by members of
a commune.35 Using the "two-tier" equal protection analysis, the court
found no infringement upon any fundamental right,36 and upheld the ordi-
nance on the ground that it furthered traditional zoning objectives, such
as: 1) control of population density; 2) alleviation of noise and traffic
29. Id. at 437-38, 216 N.E.2d at 119. Defendants' constitutional arguments were
relevant in determining whether the legislature had authorized such a classification.
The court found no such authorization and held that the ordinance was beyond the
scope of the general welfare provision of the state enabling act. Id. at 438, 216 N.E.2d
at 120.
30. 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
31. Id. at 253-54, 281 A.2d at 520. The court noted that relevant nuisance ordi-
nances and criminal statutes could effectively deal with such conduct. Id.
32. Id. at 248, 281 A.2d at 517. See also Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of
Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970), where a New
Jersey lower court struck down an ordinance almost identical to the one in Belle
Terre. The ordinance defined "family" as "one or more persons related by blood,
marriage or adoption or not more than two unrelated persons occupying a dwelling
unit as a single non-profit housekeeping unit." Id. at 342, 271 A.2d at 430. The court
held that the ordinance was an unreasonable restriction on the lessor's property right
and the right of unrelated people in reasonable numbers to have recourse to common
housekeeping facilities and stated:
[E]ven in the light of the legitimate concern of the municipality with the unde-
sirable concomitants of group rentals experienced in Margate City, and of the
presumption of validity of municipal ordinances, we are satisfied that the remedy
here adopted constitutes a sweepingly excessive restriction of property rights as
against the problem sought to be dealt with ....
Id. at 349, 271 A.2d at 434. Thus, the court found the legislative classification to
be neither reasonable nor rationally related to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.
33. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.
1973). For a discussion of single family ordinances, see Note, supra note 27; Com-
ment, All In The "Family": Legal Problems of Communes, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-
Civ. LIB. L. REv. 393 (1972).
34. The ordinance defined "family" as: "one person living alone or two or more
persons related by blood, marriage, or legal adoption, or a group not exceeding four
persons as a single housekeeping unit." 321 F. Supp. at 909.
35. Plaintiffs, as in Belle Terre, attacked the ordinance on the grounds that it
infringed their rights to privacy and freedom of association and, more generally,
that it violated their rights of equal protection and due process of law. Id. at 910.
36. As to plaintiffs' argument asserting an infringement upon freedom of asso-
ciation, the court stated that though the right to form groups was constitutionally
protected, the right to insist that they live together was not. 321 F. Supp. at 911-12.
MAY 1974]
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problems; 3) maintenance of rent structures of the neighborhood that
might otherwise increase upon an influx of unrelated individuals with
separate incomes; and 4) preservation of traditional family patterns.
a7
Thus, unlike the courts in Trottner and Kirsch which found that the ordi-
nances involved were excessively broad and unreasonable, and would not
accomplish the purportedly legitimate government interests, the Palo Alto
court, under the minimal scrutiny test, was willing to find the ordinance
constitutionally valid.
38
In light of this evolved body of law in which courts had begun to
scrutinize the methods utilized in furtherance of these zoning objectives,
Justice Douglas' holding in Belle Terre is a long step backward in that it
represents a strong reaffirmation of the traditional "Euclidean" deference
alloted municipal zoning ordinances.39 This was accomplished by the
adoption of a broad interpretation of the scope of the police power and
of legitimate municipal interests. Specifically, the Court held that the town
of Belle Terre had a legitimate interest in preserving the serenity of its
residential community.
40
Before commencing his analysis, Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority of the Court, restated the doctrine, christened in Euclid, that
local zoning ordinances are presumptively valid.41 For instance, munici-
palities have this presumptive power to exclude apartments and industrial
uses; to keep residential areas free of "disturbing noises"; to prevent "in-
creased traffic"; to obviate the hazard of "moving and parked automobiles";
and to prevent the deprivation of a child's "privilege of quiet open spaces
for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities. '42 The Court fur-
37. Id. at 912-13.
38. This differing result is possibly explained and its impact lessened by the fact
that in Palo Alto, the ordinance treated both related and unrelated persons alike
until the point at which the number of unrelated, cohabitating people exceeded four.
In Trottner and Kirsch not even two unrelated individuals could legally live together.
Therefore, the ordinance in Palo Alto may have been seen as a more legitimate
attempt to foster traditional zoning goals.
39. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
40. In Justice Douglas' words:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed to family needs. . . .The
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places.
It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings
of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
416 U.S. at 9.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 5, quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394
(1926). The Court also discussed Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), where
Justice Douglas had written the opinion which upheld a Washington, D.C., land use
project designed to rid the area of substandard housing. The remedy allowed the
razing of all buildings in a Black community of 5,000 in the southwestern part of
the city, irrespective of the buildings' condition, in order to redevelop the area. Id.
at 30-31. As in Euclid, the Berman Court found the maintenance of public health,
safety, morals, peace, and quiet to be legitimate goals of the traditional application
of police power to municipal affairs sufficient to override adversely affected individual
property interests. Id. at 33.
[VOL. 19
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ther noted that the ordinance did not constitute discriminatory action based
upon race43 or that it was an improper delegation of authority.
44
With respect to the plaintiffs' equal protection and due process claims,
the Court rejected the argument that the ordinance infringed upon plain-
tiffs' right to travel,45 because of the absence of durational residency re-
quirements on the face of the ordinance; therefore, it was not aimed at
transients.46 The Court found that the ordinance involved no procedural
disparities that would have been inflicted on some but not others. 47 More-
over, it infringed no fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
such as voting,48 the right of access to the courts,49 the right of associa-
tion,, 0 or any right of privacy.51 Specifically regarding the right of asso-
ciation, the Court noted that the ordinance expressed no animosity toward
unmarried couples, as it allowed two unrelated people to constitute a
"family,"52 and that "[t]he ordinance places no ban on other forms of
association, for a 'family' may, so far as the ordinance is concerned, enter-
43. 416 U.S. at 6, citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (invalidation
of city ordinance based on racial classification).
44. 416 U.S. at 6-7, citing Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116,
118 (1928), where the Court struck down an ordinance which in effect allowed local
landowners to arbitrarily withhold consent for the building of a philanthropic home.
45. Brief for Appellee at 16-21. The main thrust of the plaintiffs' argument was
that the ordinance barred their rights of migration and settlement. Id.
46. 416 U.S. at 7, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro,
the Court held that conditioning eligibility for welfare payments upon a one year
residency requirement unconstitutionally infringed the recipient's right to travel.
In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974), the Court
struck down a statute requiring a 1-year county residence in order to be eligible for
free non-emergency medical care. Again, the Court limited its holding of finding a
violation of the fundamental right to travel to a case involving a durational residency
requirement. See Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. REV.
1645, 1650 (1971), for a discussion of an argument based on the right to travel. In
Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
the court held that a city's plan to exclude a future influx of population by limiting
expansion to 500 new units per year, violated the fundamental right to travel. The
Petaluma court distinguished Belle Terre on the ground that the Petaluma ordinance,
had as its purpose the exclusion of nonresidents. Id. at 584 n.1. This appears to be
merely a conclusion on that court's part, as it could be said that one of the purposes
of the Belle Terre ordinance was to exclude unrelated nonresidents. The distinction
lies not in the purpose behind the ordinance, but in the ordinance's treatment of
residents and nonresidents. If both are treated alike, then no right to travel is in-
fringed, whereas if the ordinance singles out only nonresidents, the right to travel
argument becomes viable.
47. 416 U.S. at 7, citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigents may
not be denied transcripts for appellate review for inability to pay cost).
48. 416 U.S. at 7, citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(state poll tax invalidated).
49. 416 U.S. at 7, citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
50. 416 U.S. at 7, citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
51. 416 U.S. at 7-8, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (state's
law banning distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons struck down as irra-
tional under equal protection clause) ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(state's ban on use of contraceptives struck down as violative of marital right to
privacy). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (state may not prosecute
person for possession of obscene films in the home). Plaintiffs in Belle Terre had
asserted an interest in preserving the privacy and sanctity of the home. See Brief for
Appellee at 21-27.
52. 416 U.S. at 8. See note 5 supra. 7
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tain whomever they like."'5 3 The Court concluded, therefore, that because
there were no fundamental rights or suspect classifications involved, the
compelling state interest test did not apply.
54
Next, according to its equal protection analysis, the Belle Terre Court
examined the ordinance to determine whether it advanced a legitimate-
state interest. Rejecting the "sliding scale" test adopted by the Second
Circuit, 55 the Court held that since the ordinance dealt with economic
and social legislation, the traditional rational relationship or "minimum
scrutiny" test should be applied; that is, did the legislation bear "a rationaf
relationship to a [permissible] state objective" ?56 Applying this test, the
Court found that preservation of the residential or family character of a
neighborhood was a valid zoning objective. 57 The exclusion of boarding
houses, fraternity houses, and the like, which present urban problems
such as overcrowding, traffic and resultant parking problems, and addi-
tional noise, was a valid means to achieve that goal.58
Mr. Justice Marshall dissented, 59 and reiterated that deference should
be given to governmental judgments concerning proper land use alloca-
53. 416 U.S. at 9. The Court apparently agreed with the rationale advanced
in Palo Alto that while the right to form groups was fundamental, the right to live
with that group did not rise to the same protected level. See note 36 supra. This
reasoning was also advanced by the dissenting judge in the court of appeals: "While
appellants' rights to live together under the same roof free from the intrusion of
government are said to be important, in my view such rights do not rise to the status
of 'fundamental interests.'" 476 F.2d at 822 (Timbers, J., dissenting). But see notes
69-72 and accompanying text infra.
54. 416 U.S. at 8. For a brief explanation of this equal protection test, see-
note 18 and accompanying text supra.
55. 476 F.2d at 814-15. The court of appeals never reached the compelling state
interest test, as it posited that the Supreme Court had moved away from a "two-
tier" approach to a more flexible one. Id. at 814. Instead of automatically deferring
to the legislative judgment as to the nexus between methods employed and desired
goals, the Second Circuit would put municipalities to their proof. The court stated
that a "sliding scale" test was more equitable as it permitted "consideration to be
given to evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under attack, the nature
of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental interest in support of it." Id.
The key was whether the legislative classification was "in fact substantially related
to the object of the statute." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis by the court). The
court applied the test and found that the blood-related ordinance bore no substantial
relationship to traditional zoning objectives. Id. at 816.
The Second Circuit's opinion was noted extensively. See 40 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 226 (1973); 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 428 (1973); 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 262
(1973); and 48 TUL. L. REV. 412 (1974). See generally Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1972). Gunther,
supra, suggests that the Supreme Court has recently moved away from a "two-tier"
equal protection analysis. See also Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclu-
sionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61, 71-72 (1971).
56. 416 U.S. at 8, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See note 17
and accompanying text supra.
57. 416 U.S. at 9. See ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 7.25, at 540.
58. 416 U.S. at 9. Specifically, Justice Douglas stated that as a result of these
multi-dwelling facilities, "More people occupy a given space; more cars rather con-
tinuously pass by; more cars are parked; noise travels with crowds." Id.
59. Id. at 12-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also dissented, on
the ground that no cognizable "case or controversy" existed. He reasoned that since
the tenants who originally brought the suit no longer resided there, the present or
prospective tenants could assert their own rights before the courts. As to the lessors,
Justice Brennan stated that they faced no economic loss and that this was not a proper
case for the lessors to assert an alleged denial of the tenants' constitutional rights..
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tion, such as restricting population growth, controlling traffic problems,
and making the communities attractive to families. 0° He continued that
here, however, the municipality had failed to meet its burden under the
compelling state interest test.0 ' Unlike the majority of the Court, Justice
Marshall thought that the ordinance unnecessarily burdened plaintiffs'
first amendment freedom of association and right to privacy. 62 Those
fundamental rights included the freedom to choose one's associates, to
select one's living companions, 63 and to establish a home.64 Justice Marshall
concluded that the ordinance was outside the area of proper land use
control as it limited the density of occupancy of only those homes occupied
by unrelated individuals. Therefore, the ordinance reached beyond the
mere control of land use or the density of population; rather, it under-
took to regulate the manner in which people chose to associate with each
other within the privacy of their own homes. 65
Justice Marshall's dissent seems to have reflected the identical ap-
proach to the fundamental rights of freedom of association and privacy
adopted by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.66 In that case, the Court struck
down a 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which limited
eligibility to households that contained only related individuals. 67 Noting
that the legislative history of the Food Stamp Act indicated an intent to
bar "hippie communes" from participation in the program, the Court held
that a classification which discriminated against household units of unre-
lated persons was arbitrary and unreasonable. 68
In his concurring opinion in Moreno, Justice Douglas rejected the
majority's use of the minimum scrutiny test because, in his view, the regu-
lation abridged the right to freedom of association.69 He reasoned that
Id. at 10-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas hurdled these standing and
mootness problems by arguing that since a zoning ordinance usually has an impact
on the value of the property which it regulates, that was enough to satisfy the "case
or controversy" requirement. Id. at 9-10.
60. Id. at 13-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting), citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See note
13 supra.
61. 416 U.S. at 18, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). For a
brief description of this test, see note 18 and accompanying text supra.
62. 416 U.S. at 16, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483,
486 (1965).
63. 416 U.S. at 15.
64. Id., citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
65. 416 U.S. at 17. See generally Comment, supra note 33, at 401-23; Note,
On Privacy, Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670,
740-50 (1973).
66. 413 U.S. 528, 538-45 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
67. Act of Dec. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 8(a), 87 Stat. 956, amending
7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (Supp. 1973)).
68. 413 U.S. at 534. Thus, the classification violated the equal protection
clause. Id.
69. Id, at 541 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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people's banding together to better meet economic adversities 70 was an
expression of that right, one deeply embedded in our tradition.7' Further-
more, freedom of association included inviting a stranger to join one's
household as well as inviting a person to one's home for entertainment. 72
Thus, while Justice Douglas emphatically stated in Moreno that
freedom of association included the right to live with the companions of
one's choice, he espoused a contrary view in Belle Terre. The apparent
shift in Justice Douglas' view of freedom of association may have resulted
from a difference in the nature of the governmental interests advanced
in each case. In Moreno, the challenged regulation allegedly was intended
to protect against fraudulent procurement of food stamps, 73 while in Belle
Terre, the challenged ordinance was intended to preserve the residential
character of the neighborhood and to avoid ensuing urban problems. 74
According to Justice Douglas' analysis, the effect of the plaintiffs' associa-
tion on the community environment extinguished their right to live with
the companions of their choice as established in Moreno. This right,
deemed to be a part of the fundamental right of association by Justice
Douglas in Moreno,75 seemingly lost its classification as such in Belle
Terre.76 Hence, had Justice Douglas remained consistent with his opinion
in Moreno, the ordinance in the instant case could have been justified
only by a showing that the village of Belle Terre had a substantial and
overriding interest in preserving its residential character. 77 In light of
these seemingly irreconcilable opinions, it is submitted that Justice Douglas,
at least, will continue to utilize the broadest possible concept of police
power when the governmental classification involves a land use regulation.78
In accepting the majority opinion that the zoning ordinance did not
infringe upon fundamental rights, it is important to consider its possible
impact upon both the allocation of the burden of proof in future litigation
in the zoning field, and exclusionary zoning. 79 First, because Belle Terre
held that the single-family zoning ordinance dealt with economic and
social legislation and neither infringed a fundamental right nor involved
70. Id. Similarly, the students in Belle Terre banded together to acquire
economical housing. While the need for housing might not be as severe as the need
for food, which would have been frustrated by the denial of food stamps in Moreno,
it is submitted that the associational rights are identical. But see 416 U.S. at 8 n.6.
71. 413 U.S. at 541.
72. Id. at 542.
73. Id.
74. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
75. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
76. Justice Douglas, in his majority opinion, stated that there had been no in-
fringement on the fundamental right of freedom of association. See note 50 and
accompanying text supra.
77. According to the "strict scrutiny" test, infringement of a fundamental right
may only be justified when it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. See
note 18 and accompanying text supra.
78. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), discussed at note 42 supra. Thus,
the judicial deference in the zoning field, initiated in Euclid and Berman has once
again been blessed in Belle Terre. As Justice Douglas stated in Berman, "Subject
to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public in-
terest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." 348 U.S. at 32.
79. See notes 21-25 supra.
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a suspect classification, a party attacking such an ordinance will have the
burden of showing that it bears no rational relation to a legitimate govern-
mental interest.80 The effect of applying this minimal scrutiny test is to
reaffirm the great judicial deference established by the Supreme Court in
Euclid."' A heavy burden remains upon the party attempting to overturn
the ordinance,8 2 while as in Belle Terre, local municipalities are free to
advance any legislative rationale that purportedly supports their actions,
even where the promotion of such governmental interests as population con-
trol, prevention of traffic problems, and rent inflation would be better served
by means other than a Belle Terre-type blood-related zoning ordinance.8 3
For example, the consequences of an increase in population could be dealt
with by placing an equal limitation on the number of blood-related people;
the traffic problem might be mitigated by limiting the number of automo-
biles per dwelling unit, coupled with limitations on noxious uses; and the
effect of rent inflation could be lessened by implementing rent controls.8 4
Efforts to further these interests by blood-related zoning were rejected by
the district court,8 5 and the court of appeals in Belle Terre,8 6 as well as by
the courts in Trottner 7 and Kirsch.8 8 Justice Marshall also rejected this
method of achieving the alleged governmental interests when he stated
that the ordinance was both over and underinclusive.8 9 But absent a
conflict with a fundamental constitutional right such as freedom of asso-
80. See note 17 and accompanying text supra. For examples of the "minimal
scrutiny" test employed by the Burger Court, see generally Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535 (1972) ; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970). One commentator has suggested that the Court has created a
different test. Gunther, supra note 55, at 10-20.
81. See notes 12-13, 41 and accompanying text supra.
82. See ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 2.15, at 72. "Notwithstanding the differences
in languages used to describe the kind and degree of proof needed to upset a zoning
ordinance, it seems clear that in nearly all of the states the burden can properly be
described as an 'extraordinary' one." Id.
83. See Brief for Appellee at 47-59, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974), where plaintiffs argued that these goals were largely illusory.
84. All of these alternatives were suggested by the court of appeals. 476 F.2d
at 817.
85. 367 F. Supp. at 146. See note 6 supra.
86. 476 F.2d at 816. The court held the objectives to be unacceptably specula-
tive and stated:
If some or all of these hypothesized objectives were supportable, some form
of such ordinance might conceivably be upheld as a valid exercise of state power.
Upon the record before us, however, we fail to find a vestige of any such support.
To theorize that groups of unrelated individuals would have more occupants per
house than would traditional family groups, or that they would price the latter
out of the market or produce greater parking, noise or traffic problems, would be
rank speculation, unsupported either by evidence or by facts that could be
judicially noticed.
Id. (emphasis added).
87. 34 Ill. 2d at 437, 216 N.E.2d at 119. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
88. 59 N.J. at 253-54, 281 A.2d at 520. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
But see Palo Alto Tenants' Union v. Morgan, discussed at text and accompanying
notes 33-37 supra.
89. 416 U.S. at 18.
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ciation, neither would he find constitutional infirmity in a town's limiting
the density of uses in residential areas by zoning regulations."
It is also doubtful that the Belle Terre ordinance actually furthered
the goal of preserving the family character of the neighborhood by limit-
ing the number of unrelated cohabitating individuals. For example, since
under this ordinance two unrelated persons legally could live together,
there would be little to prevent the formation of homosexual or common
law heterosexual household units, which are viewed by some as anti-
thetical to traditional family associations. 91 The result of attempting to
preserve this family character will be to allow families, no matter how
large, to live in the smallest of houses, while at the same time barring
three elderly people from occupying the large manor house next door.
9 2
Such ordinances would make it difficult for two families to pool their
financial resources for a summer home, or for a low-income group to
band together to meet economic adversities.9 3 Even foster parent and
summer "fresh air" programs would be in danger of violating local law.
9 4
Second, the impact of the Belle Terre decision on exclusionary zon-
ing may be to hinder or reverse developments in recent lower court
decisions which have struck down other exclusionary tactics employed
by local suburban municipalities. 95 Implicit in these decisions is a rejec-
tion of unduly broad methods and a distaste for zoning ordinances that
have as their goal the preservation of exclusive residential enclaves96 at
the expense of the regions that surround them.97 The net result is the
90. Id. at 17 n.6, citing Palo Alto Tenants' Union v. Morgan, 487 F.2d 883
(9th Cir. 1973). In Palo Alto, the ordinance limited the number of persons, related
or unrelated, to four. Id. at 884. Apparently, neither would Justice Marshall ques-
tion the exclusion of high-density residential uses absent suspect classifications. 416
U.S. at 14 n.3.
91. This justification was rejected as a proper zoning objective by the court of
appeals, which stated that such a goal failed to fall within the proper exercise of
police power. 476 F.2d at 815. See also text accompanying note 31 supra.
92. 416 U.S. at 19 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This, of course, assumes good
faith, constitutionally equal application of the ordinance to all parties within its ambit,
not merely to "hippie communes." See text accompanying note 99 infra.
The court of appeals saw the ordinance as a means to impose social prefer-
ences on fellow citizens. 476 F.2d at 816. The court stated:
To permit such action would be to invite, upon similar guise, zoning laws that
would restrict occupants to those having no more than two children per family,
those employed within a given radius, those earning a minimum income, or those
passing muster after interview by a community "Admissions Committee."
Id.
93. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
94. See, e.g., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 248,
281 A.2d 513, 517 (1971), wherein the court stated that it would appear that a viola-
tion might occur under the ordinance even were the family to have house guests.
95. See notes 22-24 supra.
96. For an excellent discussion on why suburbia uses these devices, see Babcock
& Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1040,
1062-72 (1963). See also Sager, supra note 21, at 790-98.
97. See, e.g., Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down 2- and 3-acre minimum lot zoning schemes,
finding them to be outside the scope of the general welfare. The court stated: "It
is not for any given township to say who may or may not live within its confines,
while disregarding the interests of the entire area." Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 76-69.
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passing on of the burdens of overcrowding and traffic congestion to the
other communities in the region, which, in retaliation, might adopt ex-
clusionary measures of their own.98 In light of this possible ramification
the Belle Terre Court should have been more precise in fixing the boun-
daries within which local towns can operate to preserve their family or
residential character.
In the final analysis, Belle Terre may prove to be no more than a
manifestation of a guarded fear of communal or "hippie-type" living
arrangements, although this seems doubtful in light of the Court's position
in Moreno.9 9 Instead, Belle Terre could add mortar to the great, invisible
wall which already separates suburban from urban America.
James J. Rohn
Earlier, in National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), the same court stated:
The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way of the natural
forces which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in
search of a comfortable place to live. We have concluded not. A zoning ordinance
whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of new comers in order to avoid
future burdens, economic or otherwise . . . can not be held valid.
Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
98. The court of appeals noted: "If Belle Terre is permitted to exclude appel-
lants from its borders, other nearby communities, in the absence of a coordinated,
enforceable regional plan, may be expected to do likewise. Indeed, many already
have." 476 F.2d at 817-18 (footnote omitted). The court went on to list five sur-
rounding villages with "family" ordinances. Id. at 818 n.9. See Brief for Appellee
at 45, for a more extensive list. In light of the fact that the entire town was zoned
only for single-family residences, thereby excluding the plaintiffs from Belle Terre
altogether, the Belle Terre Court's failure to address the posed regional issue is
particularly disturbing.
99. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
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